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I. Introduction – who and where? 
Member States of the European Union (“Member State(s)” or “the State(s)”), are long 
associated with seeking to preserve their authority over migration control and border 
management. At first glance, the externalisation and privatisation of migration control 
and border management seem to challenge that narrative. Member States have started to 
embrace migration control and border management procedures which harness the 
potential of cooperation with third States and which devolve their authority to private 
actors. Modern border control is now being enforced at either side of the traditional static 
external border. Migration control and border management are no longer left behind in 
the airport after landing; they are increasingly being enforced internally. Likewise, the 
idea that Member State migration control and border management do not occur before 
getting on a plane to travel to the European Union (“EU” or “the Union”) territory is also 
proving to be highly questionable. Nowadays, the who and where of migration control 
have become increasingly crucial. The questions are: who is it that is implementing a 
specific function or service of migration control? And, where is it being implemented? 
These questions have become decisive in the allocation of legal responsibility for any 
breach of a migrant’s fundamental rights which occurs during the implementation of 
migration control and border management.1  
 The questions of who and where reflect the two phenomena that this short paper 
explores – privatisation2 and externalisation.3 Externalisation is the movement of direct 
migration control to outside of the Member States’ territory. The direct nature of the 
implementation is key. A distinction can be made between that external action by a 
Member State which includes the direct involvement of officials of that Member State 
                                                 
1
 It is useful to refer to the Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque in Hirsi Jamaa and Others 
v. Italy [GC] 27765/09. Italics are added to highlight the Judge’s opinion on the questions of  who and 
where respectively: “Immigration and border control is [sic] a primary State function and all forms of this 
control result in the exercise of the State’s jurisdiction. Thus, all forms of immigration and border control 
of a State party to the European Convention on Human Rights are subject to the human rights standard 
established in it and the scrutiny of the Court, regardless of which personnel are used to perform the 
operations and the place where they take place.”  
2
 The PhD research upon which this paper is based explores employer sanctions, privatised detention and 
the privatised removal of migrants as examples of privatised procedures as well as carrier sanctions and 
externalised and privatised visa issuance which are overarching examples of both privatisation and 
externalisation. 
3
 The author’s PhD research examines maritime interdiction, external processing and immigration liaison 
officers as examples of externalisation. 
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and that external action which is more indirect and does not implicate the Member State 
as explicitly in the migration control and border management in question.4 The latter 
softer and more indirect action may be termed the external dimension5 while the former, 
direct and hands on control is externalisation. In considering whether the State is legally 
responsible for a particular action, a court will look at the level and type of control that 
that State holds over the migrant.  
‘Privatisation,’ includes any measure that results in a temporary or permanent 
transfer to the private sector of activities that are normally associated with being a State 
function or where the nature of an activity is inherently public in that a public body or 
agency normally implements such tasks.6 This definition is purposefully wide in order to 
fully consider the disparate and unexpected ways in which private actors have become 
players in migration control and border management. A distinction must also be made 
within privatisation, between those activities that have been privatised by contract and 
those which have been privatised on the basis of being forced to comply with rules that 
have been set out by the State under the threat of sanction.7 The distinction is therefore 
made between the more traditional contractual privatisation and this more innovative 
enforced type of privatisation. The distinction may be understood in terms of the carrot 
and the stick – contractual privatisation being the carrot and private actor cooperation 
under the threat of sanction being the stick. Both the carrot and the stick approaches 
result in privatised implementation and enforcement but, as will be examined, these 
alternative avenues may have different implications in terms of determining legal 
responsibility for the privatised procedure in question. 
                                                 
4
 This distinction is also made in: Mc Namara. F., Member State Responsibility for Migration Contol 
within Third States – Externalisation Revisited. European Journal of Migration and Law 15 (2013) 319-
335.  
Distinctions within external action has been elsewhere but not in exactly the same terms, see: Rodier. C., 
DG for external policies of the Union. ‘Analysis of the external dimension of the EU’s asylum and 
immigration policies’ – summary and recommendations for the European Parliament (2006). 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dt/619/619330/619330en.pdf 
See also: Costello. C., & Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model in Peers. S., Hervey. T., 
Kenner. J., Ward. A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Page 1658. 
5
 Readmission agreements, mobility partnerships, the European Neighbourhood Policy etc. 
6
 See: Kritzman-Amir. T., Privatization and Delegation of State Authority in Asylum Systems. Law & 
Ethics of Human Rights Vol. 5(1) (2011). Page 200. 
7
 Forced privatisation which depends upon the threat of sanction to ensure implementation is discussed in: 
de Lange. T., The Privatization of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In Whose Interest? 
European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011) 185–200. 
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 The research question is two-fold: Does the control that Member States retain 
over implementation, despite having privatised and/or externalised that migration control 
or border management procedure, represent control to a level whereby Member States 
can still ensure the implementation of national policy goals and determine outcomes for 
the migrant? If so, can legal responsibility be attached to the Member State for that 
control? The hypothesis of the paper is that externalisation and privatisation can, in 
certain circumstances, contribute to the Member State maintaining its control while 
simultaneously removing legal responsibility from itself. In this way, Member States 
have been able to insert a distance8 between migration control and legal responsibility for 
that control. The answer to the research questions will allow an informed opinion to be 
passed as to whether the aforementioned distance has indeed been inserted between 
migration control and legal responsibility for that control. The challenge for this paper is 
thus to construct a conceptual basis by which control and legal responsibility may be 
reasonably measured (Section II) and to contemplate that control in the context of the 
judicial framework of the Member States (Section III) – the domestic courts of a Member 
State, the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”). The final section of this paper (Section IV) seeks to draw a conclusion as to 
Member State control and legal responsibility for that externalised and/or privatised 
control. 
 
II. Legal Capacity – Control and Legal Responsibility 
In legal terms, control and legal responsibility for that control, have been abstract and ill-
defined concepts from which it has been difficult to draw concrete conclusions. A strict 
definitional approach, which is a clear test for ascertaining control, or establishing the 
absence of control, is too strict an approach to take. This paper rather takes the approach 
of developing a definition which allows for the categorisation of control. Categorising 
control provides a more nuanced approach to the fact that Member State control is not be 
a black and white issue in which absolute control either exists or does not exist. Control 
may be categorised firstly on the basis of whether it satisfies the definition of control 
                                                 
8
 The concept of distance has been considered in similar contexts previously. For example, see: Kritzman-
Amir. T., Privatization and Delegation of State Authority in Asylum Systems. Law & Ethics of Human 
Rights Vol. 5(1) (2011). 
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(below) and secondly, on the basis of the legal responsibility that arises as a result of that 
type of control. 
 ‘Control’ in the present context is the extent to which a Member State is able to 
ensure the implementation of national policy goals and to determine outcomes for 
migrants through the contracting, coercion or acquiescence of private actors and/or third 
States. ‘Effective’ control is a control which satisfies this definition and gives rise to legal 
responsibility for the State. Examining jurisprudence from the various courts is the best 
guidance as to whether the State has an ‘effective’ control9 or not for privatised and/or 
externalised procedures. That jurisprudence’s oftentimes high threshold in establishing 
‘effective’ control means that procedures that are still capable of determining outcomes 
and ensuring the implementation of national policy goals for migrants may not qualify as 
being an ‘effective’ control and thus the State will not have legal responsibility. Such 
control, that can be very considerable but which does not engage the ‘effective’ control 
threshold is termed here as ‘determinative’ control. The distinctions made in the 
introduction within both privatisation and externalisation are relevant here. Privatisation 
that is enforced on a private actor through the threat of sanction, as opposed to the more 
traditional contracted privatisation, can provide States with determinative control and 
therefore not reach the ‘effective’ control threshold, that tipping point upon which the 
State will be found to be legally responsible by the courts. Those procedures that have 
been privatised by contract will be more likely to be found to be an ‘effective’ control on 
the basis of the existence of a contract but this is not a foregone conclusion either. 
Similarly, externalisation is capable of determining outcomes for migrants and may not 
engage the fundamental rights obligations of a State. It is only the external dimension that 
does not provide the State with an effective or a determinative control. The external 
dimension only consists of securing the cooperation of a third State. 
                                                 
9
 ‘Effective’ control as a concept is perhaps most famously considered by the Strasbourg Court in 
examining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction had been engaged or not. Here it is used in the context of 
both externalisation and privatisation.  
The ‘Effective’ control test first came to prominence with the Northern Cyprus cases: Cyprus v Turkey 
6780/74 and 6950/75. 
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Legal responsibility10 for a particular migration control or border management 
procedure in the current context refers to the success of proceedings brought against the 
Member State, by a migrant who has experienced a breach of his/her fundamental rights. 
In other words, legal responsibility entails the vindication of a migrant’s rights by a court. 
The three court settings that are examined in this paper – the UK domestic courts, the 
CJEU or the ECtHR – oftentimes set a high threshold for ‘effective’ control. The 
procedures which have been externalised or privatised therefore ask difficult legal 
questions of the EU Member States’ domestic courts, the CJEU and the ECtHR.11 The 
procedures in question have been adopted by Member States, oftentimes with facilitation 
from the Union through harmonising legislation.12  Procedures such as the privatised 
detention and return of migrants are relevant for privatisation while immigration liaison 
officers and maritime interdiction are examples of externalised procedures. Still other 
procedures, such as carrier sanctions and the privatised and externalised issuance of visas 
combine both phenomena.  
Delegation refers to the transfer of authority from the State to another actor, with 
the expectation that the delegate (or “agent”) will use that authority to achieve the goals 
of the other party (the “principal”).13 There is no evidence to suggest that the delegation 
to a private actor or the delegation into an externalised setting is any different from this 
classic formulation of delegation by the State. Among the most pertinent questions that 
classic State delegation poses are: Why has the principal delegated part of its 
                                                 
10
 Consideration of legal responsibility for both externalisation and privatisation has been examined before. 
For externalisation, see: Brouwer. E., Extraterritorial Migration Control and Human Rights: Preserving the 
Responsibility of the EU and its Member States in Ryan B., & Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration 
Control : Legal Challenges (2010). 
For privatisation, see: Gibney. M., Beyond the Bounds of Responsibility: Western States and Measures to 
Prevent the Arrival of Refugees. (2005) Global Migration Perspectives. No. 22. 
11
 Space constraints dictate that the detail of privatised and/or externalised procedures will not be examined 
in this paper. As stated in n 2 and 3 supra, the research on which this paper is based considers procedures 
including the use of immigration liaison officers, the potential external processing of asylum seekers and 
maritime interdiction (externalisation). It also considers the privatised detention and return of migrants and 
employers sanctions (privatisation). Carrier sanctions and privatised and externalised Visa issuance are 
considered to overlap between privatisation and externalisation. 
12
 Examples of where the Union has facilitated the adoption of migration control and/or border 
management instruments in this context: Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the 
Creation of an Immigration Liaison Officer’s network; Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28th of June 2001 
supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 
June 1985 (Carrier Sanctions Directive). 
13
 Cox. A., and Posner. E., Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper. Delegation in Immigration Law. 
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper (2011) No. 572. Page 4. 
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competence? Does the agent behave as expected? If it does not then what resources can 
the principal utilise to ensure the compliance of the agent?14 That Member States delegate 
border management and migration control procedures to another actor is, in itself, quite 
remarkable when it is considered how jealously guarded Member States have 
traditionally been with regard to retaining total control over access to their territory.15 The 
surprise at a delegation of procedures in an area so coveted by the State as migration 
control and border management is partly based upon the legal assumption that a State 
cannot delegate its legal responsibility away from itself. The assumption in the 
externalisation context is that the law does not allow Member States to perform in 
another State that for which they would be liable for inside their own territory.16 Equally, 
in the context of privatisation, it is commonly held that Member States cannot escape 
legal responsibility by delegating a function or a service to a private actor. 17  The 
existence of a ‘determinative’ control of the migrant as a result of an externalised and/or 
privatised procedure would certainly buck those assumptions. 
A sense of where the courts in London, Luxembourg and Strasbourg locate the 
threshold of ‘effective’ control can be garnered through an examination of their 
jurisprudence. The legal capacity of the case to be heard is of course crucial in examining 
whether or not an action has breached the rights of a migrant. The frustration of the 
complainant’s legal capacity on the basis of externalisation can occur through a court’s 
consideration of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Legal responsibility will not be established 
if, as a preliminary matter, a court finds that it lacks the necessary jurisdiction to examine 
the case. A complainant’s legal capacity can also be hampered through privatisation if the 
court, again as a preliminary issue, finds that the privatisation in question has been 
complete and the private actor’s actions which lead to an alleged breach of fundamental 
                                                 
14
 See: Guiraudon. V., De-nationalizing Migration Control in Guiraudon. V., & Joppke. C., Controlling a 
New Migration World (2001) 
15
 Stetter. S., Regulating Migration: Authority Delegation in Justice and Home Affairs. Journal of European 
Public Policy. (2000) 7:1, 80-103. Page 80. 
16
 See: Brouwer. E., Extraterritorial Migration Control and Human Rights: Preserving the Responsibility of 
the EU and its Member States in Ryan B., & Mitsilegas. V., Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal 
Challenges (2010). Page 217. Quoting Lawson. R., ‘Life After Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties’ (2004) Coomans. F., and Kamminga. MT., (2004) Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties. Page 136. 
17
 See: Ziemele. I., Human Rights Violations by Private Persons and Entities: The Case-Law of 
International Human Rights Courts and Monitoring Bodies (2009) EUI Working Paper. 
Available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/11409 
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rights cannot be attributed to the State. While alternative actions against a private actor 
may well be possible, this paper concerns itself with establishing the absence or presence 
of State legal responsibility. This paper now turns to examining how well the 
aforementioned judicial framework can respond to the challenges posed by 
externalisation and privatisation. 
III. Externalisation and Privatisation   
In the globalised world of the 21st century, privatisation and externalisation present new 
and challenging questions for the courts. Innovative forms of private actor involvement in 
governance are challenging the traditional thinking on privatisation. The Dutch Scientific 
Council on Government Policy has argued that, as a result of the increased complexity of 
a globalised society, regulators feel that they no longer have the necessary knowledge to 
make rules and lack the capacity to check for compliance.18 The implication is that the 
State needs private actors in order to govern effectively. Similarly, externalisation has 
become much more pervasive recently and is certainly not limited to the extreme 
example of off-shore processing that often comes to mind when someone refers to the 
externalisation of migration control or border management. This section will make a 
cursory examination of how the challenges of privatisation and externalisation have been 
handled in the courts of a Member State (the UK), in the CJEU and in the ECtHR. 
 
3.1 Externalisation 
As stated in the introduction, externalisation is the movement of migration control and 
border management to outside the Member State’s territory. The distinction made 
between externalisation and the external dimension represents the division between those 
procedures that utilise State officials in their implementation and those procedures that do 
not include State officials in their implementation. 19 The distinction is made with one eye 
                                                 
18
 See: de Lange. T., The Privatization of Control over Labour Migration in the Netherlands: In Whose 
Interest? European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011) 185–200. Page 186. 
19
 The external dimension was also defined in Garlick. M., The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial 
Processing: Solution or Conundrum? Int J Refugee Law (September/December 2006) 18 (3-4): 601-629. 
Page 611.  
See also: Gil-Bazo. MT., The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the European Union’s 
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on how Courts, and especially the ECtHR, have approached the external action of States. 
In considering whether the State is legally responsible for a particular action, a court will 
be inclined to look at the type of control that that State holds over the migrant. An 
externalised procedure will necessitate a stronger and more direct type of control than a 
procedure of the external dimension which only provides the State with a weak control 
over the situation in question. On that basis, externalisation is more interesting as it begs 
more questions of legal responsibility for this stronger form of external control. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a significant hurdle for any complainant who alleges a 
violation of his/her human rights within a third State or even on the high seas. As will be 
discussed below, the ECtHR has clarified extraterritorial jurisdiction in the context of 
migration control and border management on the high seas. However, the nature of 
maritime interdiction of migrants is now such that there are many variables which could 
increase or decrease the control of a Member State in the eyes of the Court. The CJEU 
awaits clarifying case-law for the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Charter but has the 
potential to be a positive force for a broad interpretation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
The courts in the UK have a very narrow, territorial based, interpretation of jurisdiction in 
the context of migration control and border management as their main precedent for a 
decade now but the winds of change are blowing through those courtrooms as well. 
Finally, mention should be made of the possible influence of “compulsory” powers in the 
courts i.e. powers such as the authority to detain, the use of force and restraint. The 
exercise of those powers have often been interpreted as signifying the exercise of 
jurisdiction but one might well ask, is control any less ‘effective’ than a procedure that 
includes compulsory powers if it is still capable of ensuring the implementation of 
national policy goals and of determining crucial outcomes for migrants? 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third Country Concept Revisited Int J Refugee 
Law (September/December 2006) 18 (3-4): 571-600. 
Finally, see also: Lavenex. S., Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control. 
West European Politics (2006) Vol 29(2), 329: “The external dimension consists of the mobilisation of 
third countries to control migration flows into Europe.” 
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UK Domestic Courts and Externalisation 
The UK courts have had an interesting run of case-law over the past few years in the field 
of externalisation. In the context of migration control and border management, that case-
law is dominated and overshadowed by what has become known as the Roma Rights 
Case or the Prague Airport Case. 20  The case concerned Roma people who were 
travelling from the Czech Republic to the UK with the intention of claiming asylum upon 
arrival. Their journey was interrupted by the actions of British Immigration Liaison 
Officers who were working in Prague Airport. The House of Lords, as it then was, found 
that the control exerted by British Immigration Liaison Officers in Prague airport in 
preventing the appellant’s journey had not engaged the UK’s jurisdiction. Lord Bingham 
of Cornhill spoke on the principle that an individual who presents themselves at the 
border of another State as an applicant of asylum should not be turned away from that 
border. The Lord stated: “…that principle …cannot avail the appellants, who have not 
left the Czech Republic nor presented themselves, save in a highly metaphorical sense, at 
the frontier of the United Kingdom.”21 It is that metaphorical border which prevailed in 
the Roma Rights Case and the UK’s obligation to accept asylum applications was 
adjudged not to have been breached. 
 A broader understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction has emerged in case-law 
with regard to UK military action in Iraq. In Smith (and Others) v MOD,22 the UK 
Supreme Court are argued to have taken a ‘functional approach,’ similar to recent rulings 
from Strasbourg on the UK’s military presence in Iraq.23 The case concerned the death of 
British soldiers in Iraq and could be argued to have gone even further than the Strasbourg 
Court’s high-water mark case of Al-Skeini24 which will be examined below. In Smith the 
Supreme Court found that Britain were no longer exercising public powers which had 
been the basis of establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction under Al Skeini. Instead, the 
Court held unanimously that the UK exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over the 
                                                 
20
 Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma 
Rights Centre and others (Appellants) [2004] UKHL 55. 
21
 Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport and another (Respondents) ex parte European Roma 
Rights Centre and others (Appellants) [2004] UKHL 55. Paragraph 26. 
22
  Smith (and Others) v MOD [2013] UKSC 41. 
23
 See: Al-Skeini and Others v UK, 55721/07; Al-Jedda v. UK, 27021/08. 
24
 Al-Skeini and Others v UK, 55721/07. 
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soldiers at the time of their deaths based on the authority and control which the UK, 
through the chain of military command, had over the individuals.25  
 It must be stated that the relationship between a person serving in the armed 
forces and answerable to a chain of command intrinsically linked to that State obviously 
represents a higher level of State control than the presence of an Immigration Liaison 
Officer for example, notwithstanding the fact that an Immigration Liaison Officer could 
be responsible for denying access to EU territory to an asylum seeker. It is therefore 
difficult to definitively assert whether a narrow territorially bound, Roma Rights Case 
approach or a broad, ‘functional,’ Smith case interpretation would be applied to 
establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction for the type of control involved in externalised 
migration procedures. 
 
The Court of Justice of the EU and Externalisation 
The CJEU has not ruled on the extraterritorial applicability of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.26 Article 47 of the Charter guarantees that “Everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy…” 
No territorial limitation has been included in the Charter. In this context it is interesting to 
consider the field of application of the Charter under its Article 51. Article 51 states that 
the Charter applies whenever the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union 
exercise their powers or when the Member States “are implementing EU law.” Costello 
and Moreno-Lax state that the Court has now clarified that the Charter applies as the 
general principles did, that is, whenever Member States “act within the scope of Union 
law.”27 There is the potential for a big impact for the CJEU on any migration control 
exerted by the Member States together or apart as they implement Union law. The 
involvement of any Union agency in procedures beyond the Union’s territory would also 
be in question. This is especially relevant for Frontex in the context of its coordination of 
                                                 
25
 Holcroft-Emmess. N., Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the ECHR – Smith (and Others) v MOD (2013) 




 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01). 
27
 Costello. C., & Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model in Peers. S., Hervey. T., Kenner. J., Ward. 
A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Page 1680. 
  13 
sea operations. 28  Clarification from the CJEU will be needed to fully set out the 
implications of the Charter’s omission of a stipulation bounding jurisdiction to the 
territorial scope. 
 Costello and Moreno-Lax further argue that the language in the Charter is that of 
competences, the allocation of power and its application in the context of Union law. The 
Charter does not speak in terms of territory within which those competences exist and 
that power must be exercised.29 Whether this means that the Charter is to be applied 
anytime and anywhere Union law is implemented remains to be decided with certainty by 
the CJEU. The real question in such circumstances will be what constitutes the 
implementation of EU law? The implementation of the Carrier Sanctions Directive,30 the 
Immigration Liaison Officers Directive31 and the proposed Frontex Operations at Sea 
Regulation32 could all potentially engage a Member State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and thus potentially its legal responsibility under the Charter. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights and Externalisation 
Since the much maligned Bankovic case,33 the Strasbourg Court has taken progressive 
steps toward a broader understanding of what can engage a State’s Convention 
obligations. It has now been established that the instant at which control over an area or 
over people becomes ‘effective’ or when public power is being wielded (the functional 
approach mentioned above), is the threshold at which point Member State legal 
                                                 
28
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) COM(2010) 61 final. 
29
 Costello. C., & Moreno-Lax. V., The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model in Peers. S., Hervey. T., Kenner. J., Ward. 
A., The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Page 1679. 
30
 Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28th of June 2001, supplementing the provisions 
of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (Carrier 
Sanctions Directive). 
31
 Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 of 19 February 2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison 
officers network (Immigration Liaison Officers Regulation); Regulation (EU) No 493/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 
on the creation of an immigration liaison officers network. 
32
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) COM(2010) 61 final. 
33
 Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, 52207/99. 
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responsibility under the Convention is engaged.34 The situation of the ECtHR mirrors the 
same struggle averred to above in the UK’s domestic courts. It is in the context of 
military action that extraterritorial jurisdiction has most often been engaged by Member 
States. It is by no means only in the context of military action that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction can be established but the Court has on occasion shown hesitation to stray 
from the territorial based approach to jurisdiction unless it is in the military context.35  
 The Hirsi case provides the latest findings of the ECtHR as to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in a migration context.36 In Hirsi the Italian Guardia di Finanza intercepted 
migrants bound for Europe in international waters and returned them to Libyan shores. 
This return consisted of taking the migrants on board the Italian vessel and sailing to 
Libya and disembarking those migrants there and was found to have engaged the Italians’ 
Convention obligations. 37 The Court stated that jurisdiction is primarily territorial38 and 
underlined the exceptional terms in which extraterritorial jurisdiction must be framed by 
stating that “In each case, the question whether exceptional circumstances exist which 
require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction extra 
territorially must be determined with reference to the particular facts…”39  
 While confirming that the interception of migrants in the high seas and the use of 
compulsory powers could engage Convention obligations, the same level of ‘effective’ 
control which included transferring the migrants to the Italian ship and further transfer to 
Libya, may struggle to be reproduced in the territories of third States. Perhaps if Member 
States began to externally process the applications of asylum seekers or if Immigration 
Liaison Officers exercised a compulsory power of some kind then an ‘effective’ control 
over persons, an area or the application of public power may be found to exist. 
Immigration Liaison Officers, carrier sanctions and other such controls gives rise to 
powers such as decision making as to access to the EU and an onus to report to Member 
States but the Strasbourg court, depending on the exact circumstances, would likely look 
                                                 
34
 The threshold of ‘effective control’, see: Al-Skeini and Others v UK 55721/07, paragraph 136. 
35
 See for example: Öcalan v. Turkey 46221/99; Medvedyev and Others, 3394/03 and Xhavara and Others 
v. Italy and Albania, 39473/98. 
36
 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], 27765/09. 
37
 Just as has happened previously in: Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC] 3394/03; and in a migration 
context in: Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania 39473/98. 
38
 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC] 27765/09. Paragraph 71. 
39
 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC] 27765/09. Paragraph 73. 
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upon such controls as providing the State with a lesser control than the compulsory 
powers of detention or the use of physical force. In this way, externalised migration 
controls within a third State are still awaiting their ‘Hirsi moment’.40  
 
3.2 Privatisation 
The distinction that has been made in privatisation is an important aid in considering 
those privatised procedures whose legal responsibility for any breach of fundamental 
rights that occurs will be attributed to the State and those which have been fully and 
completely privatised. The distinction is a guide rather than a rule as it is possible that 
contracted procedures may well still be considered to have been completely privatised as 
well. Examples of such contracted procedures are the private enforcement of detention 
and return of migrants. The privatised procedures that have not been contracted for are 
not the result of a tender for contract and are dependent on sanctions in order to force 
private actors to implement State priorities. Legal responsibility for such breaches are 
less likely to be attributed to the State.41  The distinction is therefore made between 
contractual privatisation and a type of ‘enforced’ privatisation.  
The ordinary understanding of privatisation is that the State makes a full transfer of 
sovereign power and ownership of a resource, process or function to a private actor. 
However, this understanding is not applicable to privatisation in the field of migration 
control and border management. “…immigration policy seems an unpromising place to 
look for evidence of privatisation, if by this one means the retraction of the state.”42 The 
fact that the State holds entry, exit, residence and citizenship very closely has been a 
constant since the advent of nation states. Delegation to another authority has thus been 
characterised as being made only in circumstances in which the State can retain control 
over the implementation of its policy choices. Despite this control retention, legal 
responsibility may sometimes be removed. Of course, other elements may attract the 
                                                 
40
 Mc Namara. F., Member State Responsibility for Migration Contol within Third States – Externalisation 
Revisited. European Journal of Migration and Law 15 (2013) 319-335. Page 334. 
41
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exist – coerced; contracted. Etc. See: de Lange. T., The Privatization of Control over Labour Migration in 
the Netherlands: In Whose Interest? European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011) 185–200. 
42
 Macklin. A., Public Entrance/Public Member, in Cossman B., & Fudge. J., Privatization, Law and the 
Challenges to Feminism (2002). 
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State to privatisation. Efficiency, money saving, access to specific information or other 
particular qualities and even political ideology must all be considered as points that can 
influence whether States privatises activities which, previously, it had always undertaken 
itself. However, it is important to recognise that while political and moral arguments may 
be made as to why migration control and border management should remain in public 
hands, a legal argument may also be made on the basis of a decrease in accountability 
and legal responsibility which can result in the increased likelihood of breaches of 
fundamental rights for migrants. Again, “compulsory” powers that are normally 
associated with the powers of the State will be persuasive toward establishing that that 
particular procedure and its fall-out must be attributed to the State which must therefore 
assume legal responsibility for any fundamental right that is found to have been breached. 
 
UK Domestic Courts and Privatisation 
EU Member States have varying degrees of privatisation in migration control and border 
management; the UK represents the deep-end of such investment. For this reason, the 
UK’s domestic courts are a good example of a domestic judicial system which has been 
challenged by the privatisation of migration control and border management procedures. 
The overarching research question is aimed at establishing State responsibility and the 
vindication of a migrant’s rights for a breach of those rights; rather than consideration of 
alternative avenues toward justice such as tort law. The approach of UK domestic courts 
to the Human Rights Act is therefore the primary concern here.43 The interpretation given 
to section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act, which considers the notion of ‘hybrid’ public 
authorities, is of crucial importance. Section 6(3)(b) provides that a “public authority” 
includes any person, certain of whose functions are those of a public nature. There exists 
a controversial debate in the UK as to the interpretation that the courts should take of 
Section 6(3)(b).44  The debate revolves around the broad and narrow interpretations that 
public authorities should have under that provision. 
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 The Human Rights Act 1998. 
44
 On the widespread criticism by human rights advocates of the narrow approach taken by the courts to 
section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act, see: Palmer. E., Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the 
Human Rights Act. Page 142-143.  
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The prevailing jurisprudence has afforded private actors which implement public 
functions, a narrow interpretation.45 The Joint Committee on Human Rights of the House 
of Lords and House of Commons stated in its 2003/2004 report that the great fear in this 
regard is that a private actor with “compulsory powers” like the power to detain or the 
power to use physical force or to restrain may be adjudged as not representing a 
procedure of the public authority.46 Indeed, those procedures for which the State has 
contracted a private actor to implement often include such “compulsory powers.” 
However, the Joint Committee reassures on this point: “We consider that, on the state of 
the current law, that it is unlikely that these service providers [immigration detention and 
private prisons] would not be considered public bodies for the purposes of the HRA 
[Human Rights Act]. However, the status of these individual bodies, and the nature of 
their powers, are still to be assessed by the Courts. This will take place on a case by case 
basis.”47  
The use of force during removal and the detention of migrants are likely to satisfy 
the demands of section 6(3)(b) as that section is currently interpreted.48 Interestingly, this 
is so, not as a result of the contract but because those procedures that have been 
contracted also implement “compulsory powers.” In contrast, those procedures that are 
implemented by private actors under pain of sanction are unlikely to include any 
“compulsory powers.” At the moment, the reach of section 6(3)(b) has been tightly  
circumscribed, and the section only clearly encompasses regulatory or physically 
coercive powers.49 Procedures such as carrier sanctions and visa issuance, of course are 
procedures which also have an externalised aspect to their make-up. Notwithstanding 
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 See: Young. A., The Human Rights Act 1998, Horizontality and the Constitutionalisation of Private Law 
in Ziegler. K., and Huber. P., Current Problems in the Protection of Human Rights (2013). 
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 Joint Committee on Human Rights, House of Lords & House of Commons, The Meaning of Public 
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427. 
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 YL v. Birmingham City Council and others [2007] UKHL 27. 
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Donnelly. CM., Delegation of Governmental Powers to Private Parties (2008). Page 269. 
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externalisation, on the basis of their privatised nature alone, and considering the case-law 
examined here, section 6(3)(b) will not be engaged by those procedures. Alternative 
proceedings may still be available to migrants who wish to pursue the State and/or the 
private actor for an alleged breach in the implementation of these procedures. The UK 
courts have approached the allocation of legal responsibility on the basis of the nature of 
the function involved in implementing the procedure rather than on the basis of control of 
the State and institutional proximity of the private actor to the State.50 However, if the 
nature of that function does not include compulsory powers then it will be difficult to 
have the breach attributed to the State. 
 
The Court of Justice of the EU and Privatisation 
What is in question here is the implementation and application of Union law pertaining to 
border management and migration control by the Member State which has incorporated a 
private actor(s) for that implementation and application. If that implementation and 
application leads to a breach of a migrant’s fundamental rights then that migrant may 
challenge the Member State in question for having breached the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. As was touched upon above, Article 51 of the Charter ensures that it will apply to 
the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The Court has 
distinguished some instances by which the Charter is engaged. Firstly, those measures 
adopted by a Member State with the intention of applying an EU act, a directive51 or a 
regulation52, represent the implementation of Union law as per Article 51(1).53 Secondly, 
where the CJEU establishes that a Member State authority has exercised a discretion that 
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 See: Donnelly. CM., Delegation of Governmental Powers to Private Parties (2008). 
See: Palmer. E., Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act. Page 146. 
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is vested in it by virtue of EU law.54 Thirdly, the Charter is engaged by those measures 
that have been adopted by a Member State whose subject matter is already governed by 
provisions of EU primary or secondary legislation.55 
Many privatised procedures – such as the detention of migrants, the return of 
migrants, carrier sanctions and employer sanctions – have been legislated for at Union 
level. It is possible to give an opinion as to whether a particular procedure represents the 
implementation and application of Union law or not by way of reference to CJEU 
jurisprudence. The detention of migrants is set out by the Reception Directive and by the 
Returns Directive.56 The nature of directives in general is such that it allows the Member 
State room to manoeuvre in implementation but directives, nonetheless, represent an act 
of the EU and their implementation is capable of engaging a Member State’s legal 
responsibility under the Charter.57  
 Having established that Union law is being applied, it is left to also ascertain that 
it is the State that is implementing the procedure in question despite the fact that, prima 
facie, it is a private actor that is tasked with its implementation. While complete 
horizontal applications, a private actor pursing another private actor, for a breach of the 
Charter has by now been accepted by the Court,58 this paper concentrates on establishing 
Member State legal responsibility and the vindication of the fundamental rights of 
migrants. Decisions and actions of a private actor that breach Union law can be attributed 
to the State where that actor has been entrusted with carrying out functions of a public 
character and/or where it is under the decisive control of Member States in circumstances 
where the breach at issue arises in connection with the exercise of such public 
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functions.59 In such circumstances, a breach of a right that is enshrined in the Charter by a 
private actor will result in legal responsibility for the Member State that entrusted that 
private actor with the procedure in question. The CJEU will consider all factors that point 
toward State control collectively in deciding whether the State has a decisive control 
through the legislative or contractual design or whether the nature of the procedure is 
inherently public to the extent that State legal responsibility must follow. 
 To go back to the distinction previously made between those procedures that have 
been privatised on the basis of contract and those that have been privatised on the basis of 
the threat of sanction, the former type are more likely to include “compulsory powers” as 
part of the tasks that have been delegated through contract. On the contrary, the powers 
involved in discharging those procedures which are being thrust upon the private actor 
through the threat of sanction are more likely to include decision-making and reporting to 
the authorities i.e. non-compulsory powers. It is likely that such compulsory powers will 
be highly influential to the CJEU in deciding that a particular action represents the State 
or not. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights and Privatisation 
The Strasbourg Court has dealt with cases which asked whether or not a State should 
have legal responsibility for a procedure that is implemented by a private actor which has 
resulted in a breach of a human right. In the ECtHR, there are two potential ways in 
which a private actor may become involved in a human rights breach. On the one hand a 
private actor may act as an agent of the State, and on the other hand, a private actor may 
become involved as a third party. In the former case, acts of private actors are attributable 
to the State so that the State is considered to have directly interfered with Convention 
rights; in the latter case the State can be found to have violated Convention rights by 
failing to take all reasonable measures to protect individuals against corporate abuse.60 
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The State has an obligation to ensure not only that any part of the State itself does not 
breach human rights but also to ensure that human rights are not breached generally.  
Returning to the distinction made within privatisation between those procedures 
that have been contracted to a private actor and those which are enforced under pain of 
sanction, the contractual link would likely lead to the private actor being thought of as an 
agent of the State. A negative obligation would therefore exist for that private actor, in 
acting as an “emanation of the State,”61 to refrain from breaching the Convention. By 
contrast, those procedures that are implemented by a private actor so as to avoid being 
sanctioned are difficult to classify as being a principal/agent relationship. The 
infringement of the Convention in that context may be rather considered in the context of 
a positive obligation of the State to avoid the breach of Convention rights by private 
actors in general. Non-agency relationships which develop make it more difficult to 
establish State responsibility. While the State could well be legally responsible for not 
acting to prevent the breach of the Convention, the procedure itself would still be 
considered to have been controlled by the private actor and State legal responsibility for 
that control may not be established. 
 In establishing agency, the Court has given a broad scope to what this concept 
entails. The cases of Costello-Roberts v UK62 and Van Der Mussele v Belgium63 are 
among the most important case-law of the ECtHR in deciding State legal responsibility 
for rights breaches by a private actor. In the Costello-Roberts case a joint partly 
dissenting opinion elaborated on the impossibility of a parallel system of control in the 
hands of a private actor which could potentially evade State responsibility when it stated that 
a State could “neither shift prison administration to the private sector and thereby make 
corporal punishment in prisons lawful, nor can it permit the setting up of a system of private 
schools which are run irrespective of Convention guarantees.”64 In the Strasbourg context 
then, the aforementioned assumption thus holds true that the State cannot delegate away 
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its legal responsibility to a private actor. The distinction between contractual privatisation 
and forced privatisation is relevant again on this point. Contracted privatisation is more 
likely to lead to a principal/agent relationship.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion – Delegating Legal Responsibility  
The externalisation and privatisation of crucial migration control and border management 
procedures can represent a serious challenge to the establishment of legal responsibility 
for the State. Both ‘effective’ and ‘determinative’ controls are capable of satisfying the 
definition of control that is used in this paper. However, the latter control type can do so 
without engaging the legal responsibility of that State. Common to all externalisation and 
privatisation though is that the State retains the ability to quickly change the terms of the 
relationship. Externalisation affords the State the opportunity to simply change the terms 
of reference for its immigration officials acting in an external setting. Privatisation allows 
the State to set the terms of a contract or to change the reasons for sanction as required. 
 To a certain extent, all three of the courts either already have, or have the 
potential to obtain, a high level of protection for migrants who experience a violation of a 
fundamental right in an externalised setting and/or at the hands of a private actor that is 
acting on behalf of the State. However, the jurisprudence has oftentimes established a 
high threshold of ‘effective’ control in both privatisation and externalisation. For both 
privatisation and externalisation, the use of “compulsory powers” such as the use of force 
and restraint and the detention of a migrant would point toward an ‘effective’ control. 
That migration control and border management are dependent on such powers in order to 
be ‘effective’, is a fallacy. Control can be exerted in a very meaningful way through, for 
example, decision making which denies passage to the EU or through the reporting of 
key information to the State. This paper argues that such control can be ‘determinative’ 
and can satisfy the definition of control set out in this paper but is unlikely to engage a 
State’s legal responsibility. Maritime interdiction and privatised detention can be 
assumed to represent ‘effective’ controls but an argument can be made that a less obvious 
but no less relevant ‘determinative’ control can also exist. Having said this, there are also 
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many incidences in which the court and administrative systems have failed even where 
compulsory powers have been exercised.65 
 Returning to the questions of delegation raised in the second section, it is clear 
that the answers in the context of migration control and border management point toward 
the traditional understanding of delegation. The principal delegates to an agent in the 
expectation of being able to control that agent. The agent’s behaviour remains predictable 
in the context of migration control and border management and in any case the State 
retains the ability to change the priorities of externalisation and privatisation when it 
wishes. By way of conclusion, it may be stated that the judicial framework of Member 
States is faced with innovative and still-evolving challenges. Externalisation and 
privatisation represent a development in which control by the State has evolved into 
being control for the State. This means that while the State previously engaged legal 
responsibility when it violated a fundamental right of a migrant, the delegation of 
procedures has allowed control with the same impact as before without the certainty of 
legal responsibility. This evasion of judicial censure for the State has been created on the 
basis of who implements those procedures or where that implementation takes place. In 
this way, externalisation and privatisation have led to a distance being inserted between 
migration control and legal responsibility for that control. 
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